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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 October 1951

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: Rising Soviet Pressure on Sweden and Norway

General

1. Soviet relations with both Sweden and Norway have been worsening slowly, but steadily, and are currently at their postwar low. A notable feature of the situation is the Scandinavians' refusal to take fright; the increase in their confidence is unmistakable.

Sweden

2. A series of recent events has contributed to the deterioration in Swedish-Soviet relations. Sweden's tightening of its exports to the Soviet bloc of strategically useful goods has no doubt been perceived by the USSR. Sweden's protests against Soviet enforcement of a 12-mile limit in the Baltic have been unproductive, and Swedish fishing boats and crews which have strayed within the limit have been roughly handled. The spy case in Stockholm, in which a Swedish naval NCO was found guilty of passing highly classified information to a Soviet assistant naval attache, led to the demand that the USSR recall the attache; though heard in camera, 25X1

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the case was widely publicized in Sweden and the attache's departure was accompanied by strong public opprobrium. The press continued to campaign against the privileges accorded Soviet diplomats. At recent Army maneuvers the Soviet bloc military attaches, feeling discriminated against, walked out in resentment. The flow of political refugees from Poland, particularly, continues unabated. Meanwhile, the Soviet press and radio has intensified its attacks on Sweden's "unneutral" attitude. Increasingly security conscious now, Sweden has begun to consider the problem of removing domestic Communists from defense plants and to draft new legislation to give the police more power to act against subversion.

Norway

3. Two issues are primarily responsible for the current high temperature of Norwegian-Soviet relations. One involves the Norwegian decision to consolidate the scattered graves of Soviet soldiers. This decision was taken to reduce the excuses Soviet officials could offer for traveling in Norway, but was presented as a step to make better care of the graves possible and access to them easier for Soviet officials and relatives. Turning down this explanation, the USSR is attacking Norway's "desecration" of the graves and its denial of permission to the Soviets to take over their care. The second issue involves a strong Soviet note of 15 October, which attacks Norway's NATO policy, accuses Norway of improving bases under US-British direction to further "hostile objectives aimed against the Soviet Union," and charges that Norway is violating the Paris Agreement of 1920 regarding the permanent demilitarization of Spitzbergen and Bear Island. The note concludes that by placing its territory at the disposal of the armed forces of NAT members, "the Norwegian government is taking upon itself full responsibility for the results of such a policy."

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4. The Norwegian response to this note may be expected to be a calm but forthright rejection of Soviet allegations and a restatement of its policies: (a) to co-operate with other NAT powers to avert, or at worst, to resist attack; (b) to improve Norway's ability to resist attack, but never to use its resources for aggressive purposes; and (c) not to open bases to any foreign powers as long as Norway is not attacked or threatened by attack.

5. Soviet motives for delivering the note may include: (a) intimidation of Norway, the only NATO country with a common frontier with the USSR; (b) concern over NATO progress; and/or possible (c) justification for occupying Spitzbergen and Bear Island. This last motive may be doubtful, owing to the heavy consequences which the Kremlin might expect of such aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet note stressed the importance of Spitzbergen coal to the USSR and the "extraordinarily great importance to the Soviet Union and the security of the north" of the waters between Spitzbergen and Bear Island as "the outlet to the sea in the West."

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